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Modern software applications frequently make use of multithreading to utilize hardware
resources better and promote application responsiveness. In these applications, threads
share the program state, and synchronization mechanisms ensure proper ordering of ac-
cesses to the program state. When a developer fails to implement synchronization mecha-
nisms, data races may occur. Finding data races in an automated way is an already challeng-
ing problem, but often impractical without source code or understanding how to execute the
program under analysis. In this thesis, we propose a solution for finding data races on soft-
ware binaries and present our prototype implementation BINRELAY. Our solution makes
use of symbolic execution to maximize program coverage without requiring specific inputs
to be passed to the binary. Currently, BINRELAY is limited to the detection of data races
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Introduction
We propose a solution for finding data races on global variables in software binaries.
Our solution, BINRELAY, makes use of symbolic execution to exercise the code inside of
a binary. During symbolic execution, we build a graph structure to model the interactions
between simulated threads. We later use this model and other bookkeeping information to
determine whether or not two memory accesses can happen concurrently and if there are
proper synchronization mechanisms in place.
1.1 Motivation
Modern software programs frequently perform more than one task simultaneously to
promote efficient use of hardware resources and to provide responsiveness using a tech-
nique called multithreaded programming. Since software developers must implement mul-
tithreaded programming, it is subject to programmer error. Data races are a common bug
that can occur when two threads try to access a shared variable or memory location with-
out a synchronization mechanism[1]. By their nature, data races are unpredictable and can
have effects ranging from benign to fatal (in safety-critical systems)[2], so detecting them
is of utmost importance.
While there are existing tools that can detect data races, they are generally limited in
some fashion. These data race detection tools fall into either the dynamic or static analysis
category. Dynamic tools can only analyze the executed code in the program under analysis.
With dynamic data race detection approaches, code not executed is code not analyzed for
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data races. Static data race detection tools, on the other hand, can analyze all of a program’s
code, but we found that existing static race tools require source code and are prone to false
positives without filtering. Our desire is for a tool to find data races within a program
without having to drive the program to specific bits of code and in cases where source code
analysis is impossible or impractical.
1.2 Background
We utilize several technical concepts in this thesis. In this section, we describe these
concepts.
1.2.1 Multithreaded Programming
In a multithreaded program, concurrent tasks run on different threads. Threads are
an abstraction for units of CPU utilization that are managed by the operating system[3].
A process running in an operating system may have one or more threads. To utilize more
processing power offered by modern hardware or promote application responsiveness, soft-
ware developers create more than one thread in an application. However, multithreaded
programming comes with its own set of challenges for developers. Developers implement-
ing multithreaded applications must use synchronization mechanisms to ensure each thread
does not interfere with another thread’s execution or data shared amongst multiple threads.
1.2.2 Locks
One frequently used technique for synchronization is known as a mutex lock[3], or
lock for short. Locks control access to a single resource shared amongst multiple threads.
When using a lock, a thread takes the lock, performs the access on the shared resource,
and then releases the lock. While the thread holds the lock, other threads may not access
the protected shared resource. Other threads trying to access the shared resource must wait
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until the lock is unlocked. Software developers must properly utilize the lock creation,
acquisition, and release functions, and when they fail to do so, a data race may occur.
1.2.3 Data Races
Data races occur when one or more threads access a shared memory location without
proper use of a lock or other synchronization mechanism[1]. Data races are a particu-
larly dangerous type of software defect because they may go unnoticed under the right
circumstances[4]. Adverse side effects of data races can have serious implications leading
to reliability and security concerns [5][6].
Listing 1.1: Example Data Race














15 thread t1 = create_thread(foo);





21 puts(x); // what is the value of X?
22 }
In listing 1.1, we have an example program with a data race. The example creates
two threads that add some value to the global variable X. If we follow this code, we would
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expect X to be equal to 3. If we executed this code many times, the value might sometimes
come out to be 1, 2, or 3 because the ”+=” operators in each thread constitute a read and
write, are executed concurrently, and are subject to the OS scheduler, timing, or other
factors since there is no locking mechanism in place to ensure only one thread may access
the shared variable X at any given time.
1.2.4 Symbolic Execution
Symbolic execution is a technique where a program is analyzed to determine how
an input affects the control flow of a program[7]. Usually, a program takes inputs (e.g.,
numbers, strings) from a file, command-line, user interaction, network, or other hardware
devices; program inputs invoke specific paths in the program. Instead of using a concrete
input from an external source, symbolic execution assigns symbolic values to the inputs
and then executes the program in an interpreter. Since the inputs are now symbolic, the
interpreter can execute both sides of a branch if they have a condition that relies on a
symbolic input. Symbolic execution can cover more branches of a program because it does
not need real input to reach various parts of the program [8].
Figure 1.1: Symbolic Execution Example
In figure 1.1, we provide a very simple example to help explain symbolic execution.
Before the symbolic execution starts, we create an initial state ready to start the program. In
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the example program, we assign a symbolic variable α to X. Since X is now symbolic, the
hypothetical symbolic execution engine executes both blocks in the if-else to produce two
new states. For each state, the symbolic execution engine assigns different path constraints
to α. The path constraint tells us what α must satisfy to reach the state. Constraint solvers
can be used to generate solutions that satisfy a given state’s constraints[8]. In this case, if
we wanted to execute bar(), a constraint solver might return 3 as a possible solution for α.
A well-known problem with symbolic execution is path explosion. Path explosion is a
difficult problem to overcome and is usually the limiting factor of many symbolic execution
tools[8]. Path explosion occurs because the number of distinct paths taken inside of a
program may grow exponentially. Each branch or conditional jump inside of a program
introduces a new path followed by the interpreter. Over time, as paths accumulate, the
memory of the host running the symbolic interpreter may be exhausted. Despite these
limitations, symbolic execution can find software bugs, such as buffer overflows. We are
hoping to use symbolic execution to find a different type of bug known as a data race.
1.3 Goals
In this thesis, we developed BINRELAY, a tool for discovering data races on global
variables in userspace Linux binaries. A data race occurs when multiple threads access a
memory location happen concurrently[3]. In this thesis, we focus on detecting races on
global variables because all threads have direct access to global variables[9].
A race can only exist between two operations if they can run concurrently. Multi-
threaded applications may launch threads that run concurrently or may wait for another
thread to finish before moving on. Therefore, our system needs to be capable of determin-
ing if two operations ever run on different threads and which instructions in the binary may
run concurrently.
A mutex lock can protect memory addresses accessed by more than one thread. If
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the program uses the proper locking operations, concurrent memory accesses happen se-
quentially and thus eliminate the possibility of a data race. Our system needs to be able to
determine which locks (if any) are held by threads.
Data races can be difficult to reproduce or notice, but we want to find them no matter
how often they are manifest or regardless of how they affected a program’s output. There-
fore we should not rely on external factors for data race detection such as timing, user input,
or system state.
1.4 Organization
Chapter 1 describes the motivation, background, and goals of this thesis. Chapter 2
describes work related to our system and where applicable, how the work differs from our
approach. Chapter 3 describes the design of the system in this thesis. Chapter 4 describes
our prototype implementation. Chapter 5 details our results and the limitations of our
system and design and also identifies future work to improve our system. Finally, chapter
6 concludes this thesis.
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Related Work
Academia, industry, and open-source projects have implemented race detection tools.
In this section, we discuss a subset of existing approaches to data race detection and how
they differ from our work, and the existing binary analysis used to prototype our system.
In some of the work presented here, some authors may refer to race conditions instead of
data races. In this section, we refer to race conditions and data races interchangeably.
Savage et al.[10] developed a dynamic data race detection tooled named Eraser. Eraser
takes as input a binary to analyze and then produces a new instrumented binary that makes
callbacks into the Eraser runtime to keep track of the data necessary for data race detection.
Specifically, Eraser hooks thread management, lock acquisitions and releases, and mem-
ory accesses. With these hooks, Eraser keeps track of the locks held by each thread during
their memory accesses. By checking which locks a thread holds during access, Eraser in-
fers which locks protect shared variables. When access with no lock occurs on a shared
variable, Eraser emits a warning. Since Eraser relies on tracking accesses from executing
a binary, it is subject to the limitations of dynamic analysis: it can only report race errors
from the executed code, not from code never reached.
In our approach, we do not modify the binary under analysis. However, Eraser’s
approach to gathering the information needed to reason about the threads, locks, and mem-
ory accesses in a program is still valuable for our system. Our system similarly hooks
the thread management, lock and unlock calls, and memory accesses, but in a symbolic
execution environment instead of a modified binary.
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A similar approach used in Eraser is implemented in the dynamic analysis framework
called Valgrind[11]. Valgrind provides Helgrind which is a thread error detector that can
detect data races[12]. A key difference between Helgrind and Eraser is that instead of
producing a modified binary, an emulated environment provided by Valgrind hosts and
instruments the binary. Helgrind’s race detection algorithm checks to see if there is a
happens-before relation between two accesses and, if not, emits a warning. Our work is
similar to Helgrind’s implementation in that we instrument the binary during symbolic
execution. We do not make use of the happens-before relation; instead, we use a graph to
reason about whether or not events can happen concurrently.
Engler et al. [13] developed RacerX, a static analysis tool that finds race conditions
and deadlocks on large codebases. Our primary interest in RacerX in the race condition
detection algorithm for this thesis. RacerX works by performing a depth-first traversal of a
program’s CFG. For each function, RacerX creates an empty lockset and then traverses the
statements in the function. If a lock or unlock statement is encountered, then the lockset is
updated accordingly.
After constructing the locksets, then the deadlock and race detection algorithms are
run. The race detection algorithm runs on each statement and uses the locksets for each
statement to determine if a race could occur. When operating in its most basic mode,
RacerX looks for global variable accesses that are unprotected by a lock. In the more so-
phisticated approach, RacerX infers which non-global variables need to be protected and
by which locks. While these checks are relatively simple, RacerX makes a few simplify-
ing approximations against variables and function pointers that may lead to false positives.
By ranking the race warnings, RacerX reduces the impact of false positives. Race warn-
ings are assigned point values generated from heuristics. The point values enable ranking
from most severe to least severe. However, RacerX’s approach could not be adapted as-
is to work against software binaries. RacerX relies on information that can only reliably
found in source code such as function call targets and source code annotations to tell the
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system which functions are involved in taking locks. First, since there is no source code
in the analysis we to perform, source code annotations cannot be applied to a binary-only
program. Secondly, we found that our relatively simple test binaries make frequent use
of indirect control flow instructions such as indirect branches or indirect subroutine calls.
Indirect control flow often depends on values known only at runtime, such as the value of
a register or memory location.
Blackshear et al. developed a static race condition detection system called Rac-
erD[14]. RacerD constructs access paths to approximate the underlying memory location.
Access paths are derived from source code and act as an alternative to pointer analysis.
Instead of directly checking if two accesses are accessing the same memory, RacerD con-
siders two syntactically similar access paths as a reference to the same memory. The au-
thors found that this approach was enough to find real race conditions, but false negatives
could occur due to pointer aliasing. RacerD’s approach is interesting because the use of
access paths generated from source code enables interprocedural analysis without relying
on dynamic analysis techniques or symbolic execution. Unfortunately, access paths are a
source code-centric approach that obviously cannot apply with only software binaries.
RELAY by Voung et al. is another approach to race condition detection; it generates
per-function summaries that contain relative locksets and guarded accesses[15]. Relative
locksets are two sets of locks that show which locks were taken or released since the start
of a function. Guarded accesses are tuples of an accessed variable, whether or not the
access was a read or write, and the locks held at the time of access. RELAY uses symbolic
execution before computing relative locksets and the guarded access sets, to ensure that the
per-function data best represents the calling context of functions. After symbolic execution
and lockset computation, RELAY determines if a race condition may occur by performing
intersections of the locks between the guarded accesses if they refer to the same underlying
memory. If the lockset resulting from the intersection is empty, then a warning is emitted.
The authors tested RELAY against the Linux kernel source code to find both true and false
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positives. RELAY inspired our work, but we focus on userspace binaries instead of source
code.
Another paper by John Mellor-Crummey presented a dynamic data race detection
technique that makes use of a fork-join graph. Fork-join graphs are DAGs used to model
thread creation and join operations in a program[4]. We use a similar approach to deter-
mine if two accesses run concurrently, but we generate the DAG structure using symbolic
execution instead of dynamic analysis.
We found one other work by Andreas Ibing that also finds data races with the help of
symbolic execution, but source code is required[16]. In this approach, the author uses sym-
bolic execution to explore the program before switching to concrete execution and using
ThreadSanitizer to perform the data race detection. Our system assumes no source code
is available and performs symbolic execution from the outset. Ibing tested his approach
against the race condition test binaries from the Juliet dataset and successfully found all
races. We also tested our system against the Juliet dataset and produced comparable re-
sults.
In this thesis, symbolic execution and binary analysis techniques are a means to an
end. We built our system using angr, which was created by Shoshitaishvili et al.[8]. angr
is a binary analysis framework that implements many typical analysis techniques in Python.
angr’s well-designed framework provides for natural extension and re-use of components,
as seen in the design section of this thesis. There are various other components included
with angr that enable binary loading and lifting to an IR that our system implicitly uses,
but are not the focus of our work.
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Design
Next, we describe the overall design of our system and the challenges we had to over-
come to detect data races in software binaries.
3.1 Problem Formulation
Data races occur when two memory accesses occur on the same underlying memory
location, at least one of the accesses is a write, and the accesses are unsynchronized[4].
Multithreaded programs share global variables, so we focused on finding data races on
global variables first[9]. Since data races like any other bug can exist in parts of the code
that require specific inputs to execute, we wanted to find data races without requiring up-
front knowledge about what input to supply to the binary. Therefore, we designed our
system BINRELAY to find data races on the global variables in software binaries without
requiring a user to have upfront knowledge about how to run the program.
3.2 Symbolic Execution
One goal for our system was to find data races in all parts of the program binary
under analysis regardless without requiring upfront knowledge about how to execute the
program. To this end, we used symbolic execution to implement BINRELAY. When a
computer executes a program, there is one path that the program follows based on what
inputs the program received. Symbolic execution, on the other hand, assigns symbolic
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variables to inputs and then executes the program. For conditional branches that depend on
symbolic input, a symbolic execution engine executes both sides of the branch[8].
The challenge for us was determining which parts of a binary run concurrently while
executing the binary in a symbolic execution engine. Ordinarily, threads are started by
the parent thread by invoking a thread creation routine and supplying as a parameter, the
function to be executed by the new thread. The parent thread will then typically wait for the
thread it created to complete. These thread creation and wait operations ultimately invoke
the OS. During symbolic execution, we are simulating the binary, so we cannot defer to the
operating system’s implementation. To provide an approximation of what a thread does to
the simulated state, we intercept the thread creation functions.
To simulate threads during our symbolic execution, we keep track of some additional
bookkeeping information in each state managed by the symbolic execution engine. The
bookkeeping information keeps track of the current, previous, and next simulated thread ID
and a directed graph that models the active threads at different points throughout the state’s
history. A symbolic execution engine updates the bookkeeping information at specific
points during the simulation.
We maintain a lockset on each state. To keep track of the locks, we create an empty
lockset in the initial state. When taking a lock, the lock’s address gets added to the state’s
lockset. When releasing a lock, the lock’s address gets removed from the state’s lockset.
Finally, we record each memory access during symbolic execution. We add memory
accesses to an access set maintained in the current state. A tuple of the following val-
ues represents memory accesses: the current simulated thread id, current program counter
value, whether the access was a read or write, the lockset at time of access, and the current
node representing the active simulated threads from the directed thread state history graph.
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3.3 Fork-Join Graph
We make use of a DAG structure to model the threads that may be active at a given
point in time during normal execution of the program under analysis. The DAG structure is
called a fork-join graph. Each node is a set of thread IDs that ran concurrently. The graph’s
edges represent the events that created a new node, such as a fork (thread creation) or
join[4]. Each simulation state has a fork-join graph. When the symbolic execution engine
encounters indirect control flow, it creates a copy of the fork-join for each new resulting
state. States also store references to the last node added to the graph. The last added node
contains the threads that are known to be executing concurrently in the current state.
Figure 3.1: Fork-Join DAG Example
Building the fork-join graph is a core part of our approach to detecting data races
because, with it, we can determine if two events can happen concurrently. Events of interest
(memory accesses for data race detection) can take a reference to the node last added to the
fork-join graph. For each pair of events that we’d like to check for concurrency, we first
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find the edge in the graph that created the event’s thread. Using this edge’s destination
node and the other event’s recorded node in the fork-join graph, we check to see if there is
a path between the two nodes and if there is, that there is no join edge on the first event’s
thread ID. If both of these checks pass, then the events can happen concurrently. If the first
event’s thread creation edge was not found (as in the case of the main thread) or the path
check fails, then the events are swapped, and we rerun the checks. If both cases fail, then
the events do not happen concurrently. Note that the structure of the fork-join graph stored
within a state assumes a list-like structure.
Figure 3.1 gives an example fork-join graph. Initially, the graph starts with one node.
When the example program creates threads 1 and 2, new nodes are created and connected
by the annotated create edges. When executing the program outside of the symbolic execu-
tion environment, the thread would still run concurrently with the parent or other threads,
so we do not update the graph again until we see a join operation. When the parent thread
joins on threads 1 and 2, we also add annotated join edges. Using this graph structure, we
can determine if the two statements may run concurrently. For example, we can see the
statements X =5 and X = 7 may be executed in parallel because their nodes referenced in
the table have a path without a join on thread 1 or 2. However, X = 3 and X = 5 cannot run
concurrently because of the join edge on thread 1. Listing 3.1 contains the pseudocode for
the concurrency check algorithm.
Listing 3.1: Concurrency Check Pseudocode
1 Find-Create-Edge(G, t)
2 For edge in G.edges
3 If edge.type == create and edge.tid == t:
4 Return edge
5
6 Reachable(c, t, a)
7 while c != null
14
8 if c == a.threadset_node





14 E = c.next_edge
15 If E.attrib == join(t)
16 Return false
17 Else
18 C = E.dest_node
19
20 Check-For-Concurrency(a1, a2)
21 Edge1 = null
22 Edge2 = null
23
24 If a1.tid not T0
25 Edge1 = Find-Create-Edge(a1.tid)
26 If a2.tid not T0
27 Edge2 = Find-Create-Edge(a2.tid)
28
29 If edge2 != null and Reachable(Edge2.dest_node, a2.tid, a1)
30 Return true




To collect information from symbolic execution, we instrument certain events in the
binary. When the symbolic execution engine executes the events, it runs the associated
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callback code. In BINRELAY, we are concerned with several events: thread creation and
join function calls, lock acquisition and release function calls, and memory accesses.
When the program under analysis calls a thread creation function, we keep track of the
fact that we are going to be simulating a new thread, and since there is no operating system
to handle the thread creation, we simulate this process. To implement the thread creation
simulation, we update bookkeeping variables. We set previous thread ID to the current
thread ID, current thread ID to the next thread ID, and then increment the next thread ID.
Since we increment the next thread ID on every thread creation call, each simulated thread
gets a unique ID within a simulation state. We also update the fork-join graph by inserting
a new node. Recall that nodes in the fork-join graph hold sets of active thread IDs, so to
construct a new node, we create a new set with all of the thread IDs from the last inserted
node’s set and add the new thread ID. We then create an edge between the last inserted
node and the new node. The new edge has an annotation that indicates the edge exists as a
result of thread creation. Once we’ve updated all of the bookkeeping information and the
fork-join graph, we call the function passed into the thread creation routine by the binary.
When this function returns, we restore the current thread ID with the previous thread ID
and continue execution after the thread creation call.
Thread join operations are simpler to model and only require us to update the fork-join
graph. We also create a new node in the fork-join graph for joins. The new node’s set as
a result of the join operation has all of the thread IDs from the last insert node except for
the joined thread ID. We create an edge between the last inserted node and the new node.
The new edge has an annotation that indicates the edge exists as a result of the thread join
operation. If the program under analysis does not contain a join operation for a thread, the
thread is assumed to run forever starting from its creation but this is not a problem for our
system. The fork-join graph would show that the thread could run concurrently with any
code executed after the creation call and the fork-join graph would reflect this.
Lock acquisition and release events only require updating the locksets on each sim-
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ulated state. When taking a lock, the address of the lock gets stored in the current state’s
lockset. When the lock is released, the lock’s address gets removed from the current state’s
lockset.
We also instrument memory access events. When memory access occurs, an access
tuple is created that contains the following items: current simulated thread id, current sim-
ulated program counter, the accessed address, whether the access is a read or write, the
locks held during access, and a reference to the last inserted node in the access graph. The
access tuple gets added to the current simulation state’s access set. The fields part of an
access tuple are primarily a snapshot at the point of access of the data collected during other
instrumentation callbacks, as described in previous sections.
3.5 Warning Generation
Once the symbolic execution completes, we can examine all of the resulting states.
Each state has an access set and a fork-join graph used to find any data races. Since threads
are simulated by calling the threads’ entry functions and updating the bookkeeping infor-
mation, we can look for races between memory accesses within states, and we don’t have to
consider comparing accesses across different states. Within the state, we take every combi-
nation of two access tuples and use a set of rules to determine if the accesses were involved
in a data race. Each rule must pass to emit a data race warning.
The first rule is that accesses must occur on different threads. Secondly, at least one
of the two accesses must modify the memory. Third, there must be no lock addresses in
the intersection of both accesses’ locksets. Finally, we check to see if the accesses can run
concurrently by using the reachability algorithm described in the fork-join graph section
and treat the accesses as events. Assuming each of these checks passed, we emit a warning
that there is a possible data race between the two memory accesses.
Since the symbolic execution produces multiple resulting states that may have data
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races, more than one state may have encountered the same data race. To reduce the amount
of output to something more easily interpreted by a human, we only report unique races,
which can be identified by the program counter values of the conflicting memory accesses.
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Implementation
We present a proof-of-concept implementation to validate our approach to finding
data races. To this end, we describe the implementation of BINRELAY, a tool for finding
data races in software binaries. BINRELAY accepts a userspace Linux binary as input and
produces warnings for any data races found during the analysis. With BINRELAY’s output,
a user may be able to fix the program if they have access to the source code or the ability
to patch the program binary or report the issue to the software vendor.
4.1 Binary Analysis Framework
Since our focus is data race detection, we chose to implement our system on top of
an existing framework that enables the symbolic execution of software binaries. We chose
the angr binary analysis framework because it provides not only the symbolic execution
framework, but it is also modular and provides other functionality such as binary loading
that our system implicitly requires. Since we used angr, we wrote BINRELAY in Python.
There are performance-related downsides to using Python and angr by extension.
Python suffers from a problem known as the global interpreter lock, which makes actual
parallel programming in Python difficult[17]. The global interpreter lock only allows one
thread to run at any given time. Practically this means that parallelizing our system would
be difficult without significant effort. Furthermore, Python is an interpreted language, and
this means the performance of the interpreter limits our system. Despite the performance
issues, we think that the ease of use of Python and modularity of angr far outweigh the
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performance issues for prototyping and evaluation of the core algorithm.
4.2 Symbolic Execution
Our system makes use of angr’s symbolic execution engine. Since symbolic execu-
tion is a means to an end for BINRELAY, we will only briefly describe how angr’s symbolic
execution capabilities work to give background and context for our implementation. At the
core of angr’s symbolic execution is the SimState class[18]. SimState represents the entire
state of a program, such as memory and registers. During symbolic execution, the step
method advances a state. When a state is advanced, the symbolic execution engine exe-
cutes the basic block that is referenced by the state. The result of advancing the state is
a collection of successor states that are part of a SimSuccessors object. States within the
SimSuccessor object may be satisfied or unsatisfied. Satisfied states were states whose con-
straints were satisfied. Unsatisfied states are states that were not satisfied. With symbolic
execution, states may have more than one satisfiable successor states, which means that
more than one successor state also needs to be followed.
Since stepping a state may result in more than one successor state, managing these
successor states would be cumbersome if not for angr’s SimulationManager class. A Sim-
ulationManager object keeps track of the states and is also responsible for advancing the
states. In our work, we rely entirely on a SimulationManager object to perform symbolic
execution, and we never directly step states. A SimulationManager keeps states in lists
called stashes. Generally speaking, the simulation manager steps an entire stash and then
moves the states between stashes depending on certain conditions. For example, the two
stashes that we are most interested in are the ”active” stash and the ”deadended” stash.
The ”active” stash contains the states we are actively advancing. The ”deadended” stash
contains the states that resulted in the program under analysis terminating. When a state
terminates, it gets moved from the ”active” stash to the ”deadended” stash. For BINRELAY,
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we analyze states that ended up in the deadended stash, or other words, states where the
program ran until it terminated.
For our symbolic execution, we construct an initial state such that we are ready to start
executing from the program’s entry point. Since we would like to assume as little as pos-
sible about the binary under analysis, we construct six symbolic command-line arguments
and pass them as input into the program under analysis. Using symbolic arguments allows
the symbolic execution to consider paths that require specific command-line arguments
such as a flag or file input.
4.3 Bookkeeping
As mentioned earlier, angr is extremely modular. One of the key areas where this
modularity shines is augmenting SimState objects with extra information using plugins.
SimStatePlugins can be registered with a state and then propagated to the successor states
during the normal state stepping process. In BINRELAY, we need to keep track of our
bookkeeping data described in Chapter 2. To do this, we created a SimStatePlugin named
ThreadInfo. The ThreadInfo plugin keeps track of the fork-join graph, the last node added
to the fork-join graph, the lockset containing locks that the state currently holds, the access
set, and previous, current, and next thread IDs. To update the bookkeeping data, we use
hooks for various events during the symbolic execution. As the symbolic execution engine
generates successor states, the state plugin’s copy method copies data into new instances of
the plugin.
We implemented the fork-join graph with the NetworkX Python library because it is
already a dependency for angr. To find a path between two nodes in the fork-join graph
during the concurrency check described in Chapter 2, we use the NetworkX’s shortest path
method. If a path exists, then we verify that none of the edges the path represents a join
operation on one of the threads.
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5 self.prev_thread_id = None
6 self.current_thread_id = 0
7 self.next_thread_id = 1
8
9 self.TG = nx.DiGraph()
10 self.cn = frozenset([0])
11 self.TG.add_node(self.cn)
12
13 self.locks_held = set()
14
15 self.accesses = {}
16
17 @angr.SimStatePlugin.memo
18 def copy(self, memo):
19 result = ThreadInfoPlugin()
20 result.prev_thread_id = self.prev_thread_id
21 result.current_thread_id = self.current_thread_id
22 result.next_thread_id = self.next_thread_id
23
24 result.TG = copy.deepcopy(self.TG)
25 result.cn = copy.deepcopy(self.cn)
26
27 result.locks_held = copy.deepcopy(self.locks_held)
28
29 result.accesses = copy.deepcopy(self.accesses)
30 return result
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4.4 Function and Event Hooks
To collect the required bookkeeping information stored in the ThreadInfo plugin, we
use angr’s ability to hook symbols and insert breakpoints into symbolic execution. To
hook functions with angr, one creates a SimProcedure class and then hooks a symbol to an
instance of the SimProcedure. Registering the SimProcedure has the effect of replacing a
function call with a call to the SimProcedure’s run method. Inside the run method, the Sim-
Procedure can change control flow or modify the current SimState. In our implementation,
we are focused primarily on Linux binaries, so we targeted the thread creation and mutex
functions that are part of the POSIX thread library: pthread create, pthread mutex lock,
and pthread mutex unlock[9].
To simulate thread creation, we implemented a SimProcedure that replaces the pthread create
function. angr includes a pthread create SimProcedure, but it simulates thread creation by
creating two successor states, a state that started the thread and a state that remained on
the parent thread. Unfortunately, we could not use this SimProcedure as-is, and we had to
replace it with our implementation to maintain the bookkeeping data. Details of the thread
creation simulation are in Chapter 2, so we do not detail that here.
Listing 4.2: pthread create Hook
1 class _pthread_create(angr.SimProcedure):
2 """
3 A Sim Procedure for pthread_create
4 """
5
6 def run(self, nt, attr, start_routine, arg):
7 thread = self.state.solver.eval(nt)
8
9 self.state.thread_info.prev_thread_id = ...
self.state.thread_info.current_thread_id
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10 self.state.thread_info.current_thread_id = ...
self.state.thread_info.next_thread_id
11 self.state.thread_info.next_thread_id += 1
12




17 src_node = self.state.thread_info.cn
18
19 tmp = set(src_node)
20 tmp.add(self.state.thread_info.current_thread_id)




25 self.state.thread_info.cn = dest_node
26
27 self.state.mem[thread].uint64_t = ...
self.state.thread_info.current_thread_id
28 self.call(start_routine, (arg,), 'on_return')
29
30 def on_return(self, thread, attr, start_routine, arg):
31 prev = self.state.thread_info.current_thread_id
32 self.state.thread_info.current_thread_id = ...
self.state.thread_info.prev_thread_id
33 self.state.thread_info.prev_thread_id = prev
34





Thread join operations are also implemented as SimProcedures and replace the pthread join
function. Chapter 2 details how our system simulates the join operation.
Listing 4.3: pthread join Hook
1 class _pthread_join(angr.SimProcedure):
2 def run(self, thread, retval):
3 joined_id = self.state.solver.eval(thread.to_claripy())
4 logger.debug("Join %d", joined_id)
5
6 src_node = self.state.thread_info.cn
7 tmp = set(src_node)
8 tmp.remove(joined_id)
9 dest_node = frozenset(tmp)
10
11 self.state.thread_info.TG.add_edge(src_node, dest_node, ...
join=joined_id)
12 self.state.thread_info.cn = dest_node
SimProcedure objects simulate lock acquisition and release calls for the pthread mutex lock
and pthread mutex unlock functions. In pthread mutex lock’s SimProcedure, we add the
address of the lock passed to the SimProcedure to the locks held set in the ThreadInfo plu-
gin on the current state. During pthread mutex unlock calls, we remove the address of the
lock from the locks held set in the ThreadInfo plugin.
Listing 4.4: Lock and Unlock SimProcedure Implementation
1 class _pthread_mutex_lock(angr.SimProcedure):
2 """




6 def run(self, mutex):
7 logger.debug("Thread %d is locking mutex @ %s" %
8 (self.state.thread_info.current_thread_id, ...
mutex))






15 A simprocedure that is executed when a lock (mutex) is released.
16 """
17
18 def run(self, mutex):
19 logger.debug("Thread %d is releasing mutex @ %s" %
20 (self.state.thread_info.current_thread_id, ...
mutex))
21 mutex_address = self.state.solver.eval(mutex.to_claripy())
22 self.state.thread_info.locks_held.remove(mutex_address)
Finally, we also hook the memory accesses that happen during symbolic execution. In
contrast to the thread and lock functions, we do not implement memory access hooks using
SimProcedures. Instead, we can define breakpoints in the symbolic execution engine for
memory reads and writes that invoke callback functions. Callback functions for memory
accesses accept the current state as an argument, and the details related to the memory
access are available as part of the angr SimInspector state plugin. Inside our callback
functions, we construct an access tuple that contains the current simulated thread ID in the
ThreadInfo plugin, the current program counter value, the access address, whether the read
or write access, a snapshot of the locks currently held by our state, and the last added node
to the fork-join graph.
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Listing 4.5: Memory Access Callbacks
1 def _mem_read_callback(state):
2 ip = state.ip
3 from_addr = state.inspect.mem_read_address
4 length = state.inspect.mem_read_length
5 logger.debug("Thread %d is reading from %s at %s" %
6 (state.thread_info.current_thread_id, from_addr, ...
state.ip))
7
8 if int != type(from_addr):
9 from_addr = state.solver.eval(from_addr)
10 if int != type(length):
11 length = state.solver.eval(length)
12 if int != type(ip):
13 ip = state.solver.eval(ip)
14
15 for i in range(length):
16 addr = from_addr + i




19 if addr not in state.thread_info.accesses:
20 state.thread_info.accesses[addr] = set()
21 state.thread_info.accesses[addr].add(access)
22
23 logger.debug("thread=%d pc=0x%X addr=0x%X rw=r locks=%s tsn=%s",






29 ip = state.ip
30 to_addr = state.inspect.mem_write_address
31 length = state.inspect.mem_write_length
32 logger.debug("Thread %d is reading from %s at %s" %
33 (state.thread_info.current_thread_id, to_addr, ...
state.ip))
34
35 if int != type(to_addr):
36 to_addr = state.solver.eval(to_addr)
37 if int != type(length):
38 length = state.solver.eval(length)
39 if int != type(ip):
40 ip = state.solver.eval(ip)
41
42 for i in range(length):
43 addr = to_addr + i




46 if addr not in state.thread_info.accesses:
47 state.thread_info.accesses[addr] = set()
48 state.thread_info.accesses[addr].add(access)
49
50 logger.debug("thread=%d pc=0x%X addr=0x%X rw=w locks=%s tsn=%s",
51 state.thread_info.current_thread_id, ip, to_addr,
52 state.thread_info.locks_held, state.thread_info.cn)
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4.5 Race Warning Emission
Once symbolic execution has completed, we need to find the resulting data races, if
any using the bookkeeping data that we stored in the ThreadInfo state plugin. We focused
on only terminated SimStates (states moved to the deadended stash in the SimulationMan-
ager object) as states can only be active, terminated, or stopped due to an error with the
default SimulationManager. We may miss races that occured on a state that encountered
an error during symbolic execution, but we think that states that terminated are a better ap-
proximation of how the program would behave outside symbolic execution. For each of the
terminated states, we generated all combinations of two memory access tuples recorded in
the ThreadInfo state plugin. For each combination, we then evaluated our simple rules: the
thread IDs for each access must be different, at least one access had to be writing memory,
the intersection of the locksets on each access must be empty, and the referenced nodes in
the fork-join graph must be reachable according to the algorithm described in Chapter 2. If
all of these rules pass, we then emit a race warning between the two accesses.
Listing 4.6: Sample 6 Program Output
1 ...
2 Starting symbolic execution
3 Symbolic execution terminated
4 <SimulationManager with 2 deadended>
5 Checking for race conditions
6 possible race: (0x401184, 0x40123A)
7 possible race: (0x40118D, 0x40123A)
8 possible race: (0x40118D, 0x401231)




We evaluated BINRELAY against a set of x86-64 userspace Linux binaries. We com-
pared our results against the Helgrind thread error detector tool.
5.1 Dataset
To test the functionality of our system, we developed a set of sample binaries in C.
Each sample binary has zero or more data races and branches that depend on command-line
arguments. We placed the shared variables in the global scope of each test program so that
the underlying memory falls in the ”.data” section of the binary.
We also tested our system against binaries built from the NIST Juliet Test Cases for
C/C++[19]. The programs in the Juliet dataset contain various bugs categorized into CWEs.
CWEs are categories of common weaknesses in software and hardware that have security
ramifications [20]. Specifically, we used the binaries that have bugs categorized under
”CWE-366: Race Condition within a Thread”. Each of the Juliet binaries has a slightly
different CFG, but have at least one data race. We tested a total of 32 Juliet binaries. Half
of the CWE-366 binaries have data races on global variables, and the other half have data
races on variables in memory allocated from the stack. While we were targeting global
variables specifically, we performed another test where we removed the filter for memory
accesses to anywhere but the .data and .bss sections to see how our algorithm would work
as it currently is.
Once we validated our algorithm using our sample binaries and the Juliet binaries, we
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attempted to use our system against non-trivial binaries that have known data races. To
find software with known data races, we tried to use the CVE database, but many reported
data race bugs required a specific system state to be triggered or private bug trackers hide
the details of the race from public view. Since finding a source of binaries with confirmed
data races was challenging, we attempted to modify the ”genisoimage” binary from Ubuntu
18.04, but we quickly found limitations in our system that prevented us from analyzing the
patched binary.
5.2 Effectiveness
Unfortunately, evaluating our system against a non-trivial binary has been unsuccess-
ful. We very quickly encountered either path explosion or cases where one thread was
waiting on another thread to modify the global memory in a certain way and would oth-
erwise stay in an infinite loop in the symbolic execution environment. We discuss these
limitations in greater detail in Chapter 6.
Despite the problems we encountered while testing against real software binaries, we
were successful in testing our system against the global variable data races in the Juliet
Dataset. In the first test with the global variable filter in place, we found all of the data races
in the Juliet binaries if the variable on which a data race occurred was globally scoped. We
had no false positives in either the global variable or stack variable binaries. As expected,
we missed the data races where the shared variable was passed into the thread by reference
and allocated from the stack. In the test where we removed the global variable filter, we
identified all of the data races but had many false positives. After analysis of the false pos-
itives, we found that our algorithm was identifying these data races because of a deficiency
in modeling a thread’s execution, but our rules to determine if the system should emit a
race warning are sound. We discuss the modeling deficiency in Chapter 6.
All of the Juliet CWE-366 binaries followed a similar pattern where each thread ex-
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Table 5.1: Juliet CWE-366 Evaluation Results
Expected Races True Positive False Positive
BINRELAY 72 36 0
BINRELAY (Non-Global Filter Disabled) 72 72 2448
Helgrind 72 72 0
ecuted a loop for one million iterations. On each iteration, a read and write to the same
shared variable occurred. While we were able to detect the data races on the full execu-
tion, our tool spent much time simulating each iteration when we had already collected the
required bookkeeping data after the first iteration. We were able to implement a shortcut
for these binaries to reduce the overall runtime to just a few seconds. For our analysis,
there is not much value in executing every iteration of the loop, assuming we’ve reached
each instruction inside the loop. For Juliet binaries, the loop bodies are simple and have
no additional branch conditions. Thus, once we executed the loop once with symbolic ex-
ecution, we had already captured the needed information regarding memory accesses and
could force the symbolic execution engine to jump out of the loop and continue execution.
As expected with the sample binaries, we identified all data races with no false pos-
itives with the non-global filter in place since our system was heavily tested and designed
against these samples. However, we were able to compare the effectiveness of our system
compared to Helgrind. Both tools correctly identify the data races, but with Helgrind, there
is a caveat. For Helgrind to detect a data race, the data race must occur during execution.
Some of our sample binaries accept command-line arguments. If we don’t pass enough
arguments or the incorrect values are passed into the binary, Helgrind won’t detect the data
race. Since we use symbolic execution, we can detect the data races without supplying
specific inputs to the binary. Helgrind requires the command-line arguments to be known
ahead of time. Refer to Sample 6 in Appendix A for an example.
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Table 5.2: Sample Binary Evaluation Results
Expected Races True Positive False Positive
BINRELAY 12 12 0
BINRELAY (Non-Global Filter Disabled) 12 12 33
Helgrind 12 9 0
Helgrind (No Arguments) 12 5 0
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Discussion
Given that BINRELAY can successfully find data races on binaries from our dataset,
we believe that the core of our algorithm is sound for data race detection. Unfortunately,
we had trouble finding a significant quantity of non-trivial programs because the details of
confirmed data races were challenging to obtain since the details of acknowledged CVEs
were either difficult to obtain or were already patched in the publicly available binaries. To
overcome this, we attempted to modify the ”genisoimage” binary from Ubuntu 18.04 to
create an artificial data race, but this binary revealed a limitation with our current system.
With our current implementation, we have two challenges left for potential future work.
First, we need to improve the modeling of multithreaded applications within a sym-
bolic execution environment. Currently, our system produces false positives when the non-
global variable filter is disabled. In the Juliet binaries, where the shared variable is on
the stack, our system correctly identifies real data races on stack variables but also pro-
duces false positives. After analyzing the false positives, we found that the reason for false
positives is because our simulated threads are sharing a stack. When the thread finishes ex-
ecution, we return to the parent thread. When creating new threads or making subsequent
function calls on the parent thread, the program under analysis reuses stack addresses. The
reuse of stack addresses in this way causes BINRELAY to record memory access tuples that
do not accurately model what would happen during a real execution of the binary. In a real
execution of the program, the threads would not share a stack. Instead, the operating sys-
tem would assign each thread a separate stack. In this way, most memory accesses to the
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stack would be on different memory addresses, except when the program explicitly passes
stack variables between threads. To remove these false positives, we should assign each
simulated thread to a different region of memory for the stack.
Secondly, we found that our system does not handle cases where a thread is waiting
for an event to occur on another thread. In the ”genisoimage” test, we were able to exe-
cute the part of the binary with the artificial data race, but it ended up in an infinite loop
because it was waiting on another thread to change a value used in a loop condition. Since
BINRELAY simulates threads by running them sequentially, the change to the value that
the loop encountered never happened, and the loop would run forever. A possible approach
to overcome this limitation is to assign symbolic variables to the memory locations used
in the loop condition to allow the symbolic execution engine to find a successor state that
exits the loop but still allows us to record the memory accesses in the loop body.
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Conclusion
In this thesis, we have described our data race detection tool: BINRELAY. We demon-
strated that our system could find data races in our sample binaries and the NIST Juliet
dataset. While our initial goal was to detect data races on global variables, we believe
we’ve shown that with additional work, our system could detect races on non-global vari-
ables without false positives. We’ve also identified future work to improve the symbolic
execution to handle cases where simulated threads are waiting for an event to occur on an-
other thread or external event. With these improvements, we believe that BINRELAY could
find data races in non-trivial binaries.
36
Bibliography
[1] John Regehr. Race Condition vs. Data Race. https://blog.regehr.org/archives/490,
2011.
[2] Nancy G. Leveson and Clark S. Turner. An Investigation of the Therac-25 Accidents.
Computer, 1993.
[3] Abraham Silberschatz, Peter Baer Galvin, and Greg Gagne. Operating System Con-
cepts. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., ninth edition, 2013.
[4] John Mellor-Crummey. On-the-fly detection of data races for programs with nested
fork-join parallelism. In Proceedings of the 1991 ACM/IEEE Conference on Super-
computing, Supercomputing ’91, page 24–33, New York, NY, USA, 1991. Associa-




[7] James C. King. Symbolic Execution and Program Testing. Communications of the
ACM, 1976.
37
[8] Giovanni Shoshitaishvili, Yan and Wang, Ruoyu and Salls, Christopher and Stephens,
Nick and Polino, Mario and Dutcher, Audrey and Grosen, John and Feng, Siji and
Hauser, Christophe and Kruegel, Christopher and Vigna. SoK: (State of) The Art of
War: Offensive Techniques in Binary Analysis. In IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy, 2016.
[9] pthreads(7) - Linux man page. https://linux.die.net/man/7/pthreads.
[10] Stefan Savage, Michael Burrows, Greg Nelson, Patrick Sobalvarro, and Thomas An-
derson. Eraser: A Dynamic Data Race Detector for Multi-Threaded Programs. Op-
erating Systems Review (ACM), 31(5):27–37, 1997.
[11] Nicholas Nethercote and Julian Seward. Valgrind: A framework for heavyweight
dynamic binary instrumentation. ACM SIGPLAN Notices, 42(6):89–100, 2007.
[12] Helgrind: A Thread Error Detector.
[13] Dawson Engler and Ken Ashcraft. RacerX: Effective, Static Detection of Race Con-
ditions and Deadlocks. ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review, 2003.
[14] Sam Blackshear, Nikos Gorogiannis, Peter W. O’Hearn, and Ilya Sergey. RacerD:
compositional static race detection. Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Lan-
guages, 2(OOPSLA):1–28, 2018.
[15] Jw Voung, R Jhala, and S Lerner. RELAY: static race detection on millions of lines of
code. ESEC/FSE ’07 Proceedings of the the 6th joint meeting of the European soft-
ware engineering conference and the ACM SIGSOFT symposium on The foundations
of software engineering, 2007.
[16] Andreas Ibing. Efficient data-race detection with dynamic symbolic execution. In
IEEE Software Engineering Workshop, September 2016.
[17] Global Interpreter Lock. https://wiki.python.org/moin/GlobalInterpreterLock.
38
[18] angr API Documentation. https://angr.io/api-doc/.
[19] https://samate.nist.gov/SARD/testsuite.php.















11 logger = logging.getLogger(name=__name__)
12 logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)
13
14 MAX_ARG_BYTES = 20
15
16 if __name__ == "__main__":
17 ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(
18 description="Find race conditions on a given binary.")
19 ap.add_argument("binary", help="the binary to analyze")
20 ap.add_argument("-d", "--disable-filter", action="store_true",
21 default=False, help="Disable global variable ...
filter (experimental)")
22 ap.add_argument("-u", "--unicorn", action="store_true",
23 default=False, help="Use the unicorn engine")
24 ap.add_argument("-l", "--loop-hooks", action="store_true",
25 default=False, help="Use loop hooks")
26 args = ap.parse_args()
27
28 logger.info("Finding races in %s" % (args.binary))
29




33 if True == args.loop_hooks:
34 binrelay.utils.hook_loops(project)
35
36 arg_size = project.arch.byte_width * MAX_ARG_BYTES
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47 state = project.factory.entry_state(args=analysis_args)
48 if True == args.unicorn:
49 for opt in angr.options.unicorn:
50 state.options.add(opt)
51
52 race_finder = project.analyses.RaceFinder(
53 initial_state=state, ...
disable_global_filter=args.disable_filter)







7 import networkx as nx
8
9 from .utils import pthread_exit
10
11 logger = logging.getLogger(name=__name__)
12 logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)
13
14 READ = "read"







22 self.prev_thread_id = None
23 self.current_thread_id = 0
24 self.next_thread_id = 1
25
26 self.TG = nx.DiGraph()




30 self.locks_held = set()
31
32 self.accesses = {}
33
34 @angr.SimStatePlugin.memo
35 def copy(self, memo):
36 result = ThreadInfoPlugin()
37 result.prev_thread_id = self.prev_thread_id
38 result.current_thread_id = self.current_thread_id
39 result.next_thread_id = self.next_thread_id
40
41 result.TG = copy.deepcopy(self.TG)
42 result.cn = copy.deepcopy(self.cn)
43
44 result.locks_held = copy.deepcopy(self.locks_held)
45






52 A Sim Procedure for pthread_create
53 """
54
55 def run(self, nt, attr, start_routine, arg):
56 thread = self.state.solver.eval(nt)
57
58 self.state.thread_info.prev_thread_id = ...
self.state.thread_info.current_thread_id
59 self.state.thread_info.current_thread_id = ...
self.state.thread_info.next_thread_id
60 self.state.thread_info.next_thread_id += 1
61




66 src_node = self.state.thread_info.cn
67
68 tmp = set(src_node)
69 tmp.add(self.state.thread_info.current_thread_id)




74 self.state.thread_info.cn = dest_node
75
76 self.state.mem[thread].uint64_t = ...
self.state.thread_info.current_thread_id
77 self.call(start_routine, (arg,), 'on_return')
78
79 def on_return(self, thread, attr, start_routine, arg):
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80 prev = self.state.thread_info.current_thread_id
81 self.state.thread_info.current_thread_id = ...
self.state.thread_info.prev_thread_id
82 self.state.thread_info.prev_thread_id = prev
83







91 def run(self, thread, retval):
92 joined_id = self.state.solver.eval(thread.to_claripy())
93 logger.debug("Join %d", joined_id)
94
95 src_node = self.state.thread_info.cn
96 tmp = set(src_node)
97 tmp.remove(joined_id)
98 dest_node = frozenset(tmp)
99
100 self.state.thread_info.TG.add_edge(src_node, dest_node, ...
join=joined_id)





106 A simprocedure that is executed when a lock (mutex) is taken.
107 """
108
109 def run(self, mutex):
110 logger.debug("Thread %d is locking mutex @ %s" %
111 (self.state.thread_info.current_thread_id, ...
mutex))






118 A simprocedure that is executed when a lock (mutex) is released.
119 """
120
121 def run(self, mutex):
122 logger.debug("Thread %d is releasing mutex @ %s" %
123 (self.state.thread_info.current_thread_id, ...
mutex))





129 ip = state.ip
43
130 from_addr = state.inspect.mem_read_address
131 length = state.inspect.mem_read_length
132 logger.debug("Thread %d is reading from %s at %s" %
133 (state.thread_info.current_thread_id, from_addr, ...
state.ip))
134
135 if int != type(from_addr):
136 from_addr = state.solver.eval(from_addr)
137 if int != type(length):
138 length = state.solver.eval(length)
139 if int != type(ip):
140 ip = state.solver.eval(ip)
141
142 for i in range(length):
143 addr = from_addr + i




146 if addr not in state.thread_info.accesses:
147 state.thread_info.accesses[addr] = set()
148 state.thread_info.accesses[addr].add(access)
149
150 logger.debug("thread=%d pc=0x%X addr=0x%X rw=r locks=%s tsn=%s",





156 ip = state.ip
157 to_addr = state.inspect.mem_write_address
158 length = state.inspect.mem_write_length
159 logger.debug("Thread %d is reading from %s at %s" %
160 (state.thread_info.current_thread_id, to_addr, ...
state.ip))
161
162 if int != type(to_addr):
163 to_addr = state.solver.eval(to_addr)
164 if int != type(length):
165 length = state.solver.eval(length)
166 if int != type(ip):
167 ip = state.solver.eval(ip)
168
169 for i in range(length):
170 addr = to_addr + i




173 if addr not in state.thread_info.accesses:
174 state.thread_info.accesses[addr] = set()
175 state.thread_info.accesses[addr].add(access)
176
177 logger.debug("thread=%d pc=0x%X addr=0x%X rw=w locks=%s tsn=%s",
44




182 def find_create_edge_dest(G, t):
183 for _, d, attrs in G.edges(data=True):





189 def reachable(G, c, tid, a):
190 if c == a[5]:
191 return True
192 path = nx.shortest_path(G, source=c, target=a[5])
193 for s, t in zip(path, path[1:]):
194 attrs = G.get_edge_data(s, t)
195 if "join" in attrs and tid == attrs["join"]:
196 return False





202 def check(G, a1, a2):
203 c1 = None
204 c2 = None
205 if 0 != a1[0]:
206 c1 = find_create_edge_dest(G, a1[0])
207 if 0 != a2[0]:
208 c2 = find_create_edge_dest(G, a2[0])
209
210 if None != c2 and True == reachable(G, c2, a2[0], a1):
211 return True







219 RaceFinder is the point of this entire project!
220 """
221
222 def __init__(self, initial_state=None, ...
disable_global_filter=False):
223 # Save off the SimProcedures so they can be restored ...
post-analysis.
224 orig_hooks = copy.deepcopy(self.project._sim_procedures)
225
226 # Setup BINRELAY's SimProcedures.
227 # XXX: Need to do this in a cross-platform way, right now ...
we assume










236 # Setup the symbolic execution.
237 checked_ranges = set()
238 for section in self.project.loader.main_object.sections:
239 if section.name == ".data" or section.name == ".bss":
240 checked_ranges.add((section.vaddr, section.memsize))
241
242 if None == initial_state:










252 simmgr = ...
self.project.factory.simulation_manager(initial_state)
253 simmgr.use_technique(angr.exploration_techniques.Spiller())
254 logger.info("Starting symbolic execution")
255 simmgr.run()
256 logger.info("Symbolic execution terminated")
257
258 checked_ranges = set()
259 for section in self.project.loader.main_object.sections:





265 logger.info("Checking for race conditions")
266
267 races = set()
268
269 for st in simmgr.deadended:
270 for addr in st.thread_info.accesses.keys():
271 if False == disable_global_filter and True == ...










278 for combo in combinations:
279 a0 = combo[0]
280 a1 = combo[1]
281
282 if a0[0] == a1[0]:
283 continue
284 if a0[3] == READ and a1[3] == READ:
285 continue
286 if len(a0[4].intersection(a1[4])) > 0:
287 continue
288
289 result = check(st.thread_info.TG, a0, a1)
290 if True == result:
291 logger.debug("possible race on 0x%X", addr)
292 logger.debug("thread=%d, pc=0x%X ...
addr=0x%X rw=%s locks=%s tsn=%s",
293 a0[0], a0[1], a0[2], a0[3], ...
a0[4], a0[5])
294 logger.debug("thread=%d, pc=0x%X ...
addr=0x%X rw=%s locks=%s tsn=%s",
295 a1[0], a1[1], a1[2], a1[3], ...
a1[4], a1[5])
296 race = tuple(sorted([a0[1], a1[1]]))
297 races.add(race)
298
299 for race in races:
300 logger.info("possible race: (0x%X, 0x%X)", race[0], ...
race[1])
301 logger.info("Race Analysis Complete")
302
303 # Restore sim procedures
304 self.project._sim_procedures = orig_hooks
305
306






















19 def __init__(self, dest_addr):
20 self.hit_count_for_tid = {}
21 self.dest_addr = dest_addr
22
23 def __call__(self, state):








28 state.ip = self.dest_addr








35 def hook_loops(proj, max_iters=10):
36 proj.analyses.CFGFast()
37
38 loop_finder_result = proj.analyses.LoopFinder()
39
40 for loop in loop_finder_result.loops:
41 edge = loop.break_edges[0]
42 logger.debug(edge)
43 src_block = proj.factory.block(edge[0].addr)
44 jmp_out_addr = src_block.instruction_addrs[-1]










55 cfg = proj.analyses.CFGFast()
56 for func in cfg.functions:
57 f = cfg.kb.functions.function(func)
58 for callsite in f.get_call_sites():
59 target = f.get_call_target(callsite)
60 target_func = cfg.kb.functions.function(target)
61 if "pthread_exit" == target_func.name:
48
62 bb = proj.factory.block(callsite)
63 proj.hook(bb.instruction_addrs[-1], ...
hook=pthread_exit_hook)
64 print("pthread_exit call @ 0x%X" % ...
(bb.instruction_addrs[-1]))
Listing A.4: binrelay/ init .py
1 from .tep import *
2 from .utils import *
3 from .race_analysis import *
49
Appendix B
Sample Binary Source Code
Listing B.1: Samples Makefile





6 gcc $@.c -o $@ -pthread
7
8 clean:
9 rm -f $(SAMPLES)














14 x = 7; // Write
15 }
16






22 x = 3; // Write
23
24 pthread_create(&t1, NULL, t1_body, NULL);























14 x = 7; // Write
15 }
16





22 pthread_create(&t1, NULL, t1_body, NULL);
23 x = 3; // Write
























14 x = 7; // Write
15 }
16





22 pthread_create(&t1, NULL, t1_body, NULL);
23 pthread_create(&t2, NULL, t2_body, NULL);
24














5 static int x = 0; // Expecting no races thanks to mutex
6
















22 pthread_create(&t1, NULL, t1_body, NULL);
23
24 pthread_mutex_lock(&mutex);



















10 foo += 1; // Read and Write
11 }
12
13 int main(int argc, char **argv)
14 {
15 int result = 0;




20 foo = 0;
21
22 if (2 > argc)
23 {




28 number = atoi(argv[1]);
29
30 pthread_create(&thread, NULL, thread_body, NULL);













7 int foo; // Expecting 3 races: 2x Read-Write, 1x Write-Write
8









18 int main(int argc, char **argv)
19 {
20 int result = 0;




25 foo = 0;
26
27 if (2 > argc)
28 {




33 if (0 == strcmp(password, argv[1]))
34 {
35 pthread_create(&thread, NULL, thread_body, NULL);
36 for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++)
37 {
38 foo += 1; // Read and Write
39 }
40 pthread_join(thread, NULL);
41 }
42
43 printf("value=%d\n", foo);
44 return result;
45 }
54
